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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

The nature of the case from Appellant's standpoint is set forth in Appellant's Opening
Brief, on file herein.

However, Appellant would note that, while it is accurate that the

Department of Labor ("Department") did not choose to appeal the Idaho Industrial Commission's
Order in Appellant's favor, both the Department and the Employer (who, up until that point, had
not participated in the proceedings) unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the Industrial
Commission's ruling, which is included in the Clerk's Record, at 202 -225. Moreover, Appellant
takes issue with Respondent's characterization of his filings as untimely, as will be discussed in
further detail hereinbelow.

B.

Course of the Proceedings

Likewise, the Course of Proceedings from Appellant's standpoint are set forth in
Appellant's opening Brief, and, for sake of brevity, will not be repeated at length herein, but a
summary is imperative, including the proceedings of the underlying Department of Labor and
Industrial Commission (I.LC.) proceedings: November 25, 2015 (Department's Denial of
benefits); December 9, 2015 (Appeal to I.LC.); January, 2016-April 4, 2016 (Briefings of
parties in the course of the I.LC. Appeal); April 29, 2016 (Decision of I.LC., reversing
Department Decisions); May 19, 2016 (Motions filed for Reconsideration by the Department and
Employer (represented by Charles Lempesis, who had not previously participated in the
proceedings); August 25, 2016 (formal Notice of Tort Claim filed to the Secretary of State);
September 26, 2016 (I.LC. Decision Denying Reconsideration Motions of the Department and

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

1

Employer); February 6, 2017 (letter from State Risk Management, denying liability, copied to
IDOL/Werth); March 20, 2017 (Complaint to District Court). The dates of the respective filings
set forth in Respondent's Brief is accurate and true, and the Register of Action and Clerk's
Record speak for themselves with regard to said dates and documents.
C.

Concise Statement of the Facts

The fact pattern from Appellant's standpoint is also set forth in the Opening Brief;
however, Respondent's recitation of the facts warrants some degree of further discussion.
Initially, Respondent states that "As of November 25, 2015, when the second hearing
officer's decision was entered, the period of delay resulting from Defendants' alleged negligence
ended. Johnson has not pointed to any negligent acts that occurred after that date." Respondent's
Brief at 4. This is not accurate. Even if, arguably, the issuance of the hearing officer established
the date on which the delay ended, it does not establish when Appellant knew, or reasonably
should have known, he had suffered damages due to the delay, nor the extent of the damages,
which begins the time period for filing under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, even after
Appellant received the Industrial Commission's decision, Respondent created further delay by
seeking a reconsideration of the same, on the last date on which to move for a reconsideration
under the Industrial Commission's Rule, thus resulting in evenfurther delay in obtaining a final
decision with regard to Appellant's unemployment benefits and, in doing so, presented what
Appellant believes to be inaccurate assertions.

R. 265-276 (Department's Motion for

Reconsideration. It should also be noted that, in rendering its decision on Reconsideration, the
Industrial Commission referred to the transcript prepared by Plaintiff, which was not accepted by
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the Department to avoid a second hearing. R. p. 212, 213, 215-216, 218, 220, 223. As such, it
would be reasonable to conclude that, not only did the deadline for filing a Notice of Tort Claim
begin running at the time of the Industrial Commission's first decision, it actually would have
began running when the Industrial Commission issued its decision denying reconsideration.
However, since Appellant submitted his Tort Claim prior to the decision on reconsideration, that
possibility need not be discussed at length.
Further, in light of the District Court's denial of Appellant's Motion for Additional
Discovery, Respondent Department, believed to be acting on the advice of the same counsel who
is representing it in the instant case, and who represented the Department during the course of
the Industrial Commission appeal, continued to engage in obstreperous behavior by either failing
to respond adequately to Appellant's public records requests with regard to documents
concerning the Department's handling of his unemployment claim, or quoting unreasonably
exorbitant prices for labor and copying. R. 314 - 315. Therefore, Appellant disagrees with the
assertion that there are not subsequent acts on the part of, or on behalf of, the Department with
which he takes issue.
With regard to the remaining facts from Appellant's perspective, Appellant will refer to
those as set forth in his Opening Brief, and in course of his Argument below.

III.

A.

ARGUMENT

The Second Set of Post-Trial Motions Did Terminate or Suspend the Time

for Filing an Appeal.
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Respondent first argues that the second set of Post-Judgment Motions, and, likewise, this
Appeal, were not timely filed. Respondent's Brief at 9-14. This entire argument turns upon
whether or not the deadline for the filing of Motion that qualifies under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) is likewise extended by the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, which,
unquestionably, extends the deadline for the filing of an Appeal.
The nature of a Rule 59(e) Motion is discussed by this Court in the case of First Sec.
Bankv. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,603,570 P.2d 276,281 (1977). In the Neibauer case, this Court

made several significant holdings: (1) That a Motion, even it it may be brought under Rule 60(b)
or otherwise, may be treated as being brought under Rule 59(e) if it is brought within the time
limits; and (2) that one of the purposes of a Motion under 59( e) is "to correct errors both of fact
and law that had occurred in its proceedings." and "[provide] a mechanism to circumvent
appeal." Id.
Given, then, that a Rule 59(e) Motion is a substitute for an appeal, allowing the District
Court to correct its own errors to avoid the necessity of the time and expense involved in an
appeal, the other principles applicable to an appeal logically follow. This would mean that, since
the Motion for Reconsideration extended the deadline for the appeal, it likewise extended the
deadline for a Rule 59(e) Motion. A Rule 59(e) Motion also tolls the deadline for appeal, id.,
and so, therefore, the instant appeal, filed within forty-two days from the denial of the 59(e)
Motion is timely.
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Respondents cite to the case of Dunlap v. Cassia
Memorial Hospital, 134 Idaho 233, 999 P.2d 888 (2000). However, there are several important
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distinctions between Dunlap and the Instant Case:

(1) In Dunlap, the second Motion to

Reconsider was brought following a Motion treated as a Rule 59(e) Motion.

Id. at 235.

Notwithstanding the fact that Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) expressly excludes a Rule 59(e) order from
Reconsideration, procedurally, there is a distinct difference between the two Motions: A Motion
to Reconsider is intended to allow the Court to reconsider a pre-judgment Order, which would
include an Order Granting Summary Judgment, and, therefore, must be brought within fourteen
days of the Judgment following said order. (2) In Dunlap, the second Motion was not denied on
its merits, it was stricken. Id. at 234. Once the Motion was stricken, any possible tolling effect it
may have had on further proceedings would, necessarily, disappear. In this case, Appellant's
second set of post-trial Motions were denied, with timeliness being one of the grounds for the
denial. Finally, (3) in Dunlap, the Appellants did not raise the District Court's Order striking the
second Motion for Reconsideration as an issue on appeal. Id. at 236. Thus, the issue of its
possible timeliness and the correctness of the District Court's grant of the Motion to Strike, were
not properly before this Court. In this case, Appellant directly raises the denial of the Motions as
an issue on Appeal.
Therefore, for these reasons, the District Court erred in its determination that the second
set of post-judgment motions were untimely, and in its opinion that the time for appeal began to
run from the denial of the first Motion for Reconsideration.

As such, the District Court's

decision denying the Motions should be REVERSED, the matter remanded, and this Court
should consider Appellant's argument on the merits of the Order dismissing the case at the
District Court level.
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B.

The District Court Erred in Granting the Motion to Dismiss.

Having discussed the issue concerning timeliness, the remaining discussion bears upon
the merits upon the District Court's grant of the Dismissal, and denial of the post-judgment
Motions. If the District Court was erroneous in its grant of the Motion to Dismiss, then, it
follows, that it abused its discretion in the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and
remaining post-judgment Motions. As such, much of the following Argument will echo the
arguments raised in Appellant's Opening Brief.
1.

Accrual of Appellant's Cause of Action for Negligence.
Initially, the District Court held that Appellant's cause of action accrued on the date of the

second Appeals Bureau decision (November 25, 2015) and, therefore, began the one-hundredeighty (180) day period on that date. Memorandum Decision at 14. (R. at 86). However, said
decision was not favorable to Appellant.

Therefore, while attorneys' fees from the second

hearing could have been determined at that point, the significant additional financial damages
resulting from the delay in the payment of benefits could not have been determined at that point,
as it had not yet been determined that Mr. Johnson was going to be entitled to benefits. Also,
Appellant could not have anticipated the representations and subsequent conduct of the
Department during and following the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, which
further prolonged the matter. As a small example, in Respondent's May 19 (and amended May
20, 2016), Motion for Reconsideration, the Department, submitted to the I.LC., provably untrue
statements, with the apparent expectation that they rely upon the same. The I.LC. was not misled
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and, in its denial of the Motions, expressed apparent disapproval and displeasure. (Record at
211).
Moreover, at that point, the incurred damages which Mr. Johnson could determine with
any degree of certainty were growing borrowed funds for living expenses and attorneys' fees and
costs. Mr. Johnson, as the, then, non-prevailing party, may likely have only been entitled to
bring a cause of action solely for attorneys' fees as damages. It was not until he received the
Industrial Commission's decision on or about April 29, 2016, that Mr. Johnson discovered that he
suffered additional damages in the form of a delay in payment of benefits. Declaration of Dale
Johnson, 12 (R. at 57).
Unlike in the case of an intentional tort, a cause of action for negligence does not accrue
until the Plaintiff has suffered actual damage as a direct and proximate result of said negligence.
See, e.g., Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,254,678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984) ("it is axiomatic that

in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must prove actual damage."). Until
the favorable Industrial Commission decision of April 29, 2016, Appellant had no way of
knowing if, in fact, he would be entitled to damages as a result of the delay in the grant of
benefits, let alone the extent of said damages. The Idaho Court of Appeals has also held that "a
claimant 'discovers' his claim against the governmental entity only when he becomes fully
apprised of the injury or damage and of the governmental entity's role. The question of when the
claimant should have discovered the governmental entity's role is a question of material fact
which, if genuinely disputed, is inappropriate for determination on Summary Judgment."
Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553, 758 P.2d 710, 712 (Ct. App. 1988). Laying aside, for a
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moment, the fact that, even at this point, absent further discovery, the full extent of the
governmental entity's role is unclear, Mr. Johnson did not and could not have become fully
apprised of the injury or damage until the issuance of the favorable Industrial Commission
decision, at the earliest. Therefore, the District Court erred in its determination that Appellant's
cause of action accrued at the time of the unfavorable Department of Labor decision in
November of 2015.
While there are instances in which this Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the
cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence, such as Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake 98
Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977) and Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d
1162 (Ct. App. 1994), these cases may be distinguished on the basis that they involved personal
injuries in which the nature of the injury was, to a great extent, clear at the time of the incident,
or shortly thereafter. The Plaintiff in Ralphs was clearly aware that he had been attacked and
injured at the time of the occurrence, and the Plaintiff in Mallory was clearly aware that she had
fallen and injured herself at the time of the occurrence, and could have filed immediately. In this
case, however, Mr. Johnson could not have filed a claim seeking damages for the delay in
payment of his unemployment benefits either immediately upon discovering the loss of the
recording, nor upon the issuance of the second unfavorable decision, as he did not know that
there would ever be any benefits paid until the Industrial Commission made that determination.
This case is more akin to the situation in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685
( 1981 ). The ongoing nature of the proceedings are more analogous to an ongoing "project", or
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continuing tort rather than a single injury that may have become aggravated at a later date. In
Farber,the Court stated that:

The purposes of I.C. § 6-905 are to (1) save needless expense and litigation by
providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between
parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the
injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow
the state to prepare defenses. Unless the contract and all of the acts performed
pursuant to the contract have been completed, it would be difficult for the state to
determine the nature or extent of its liability or prepare a defense to any claim.
Furthermore, if parties can present the state with a complete and definite claim for
damages arising from the continuing tort, then the state may attempt a settlement
on the basis of clearly ascertainable facts. If we were to adopt a contrary view,
settlements would either be based on pre-completion, speculative damages, or
would have to await the completion of the project. A strict or literal interpretation
of the notice requirements of the ITCA would result in denying the legitimate
claims of those who have suffered injury at the hands of the state, without
furthering in the least the legislative purposes behind the statute.
Farber, 102 Idaho at 401-02, 630 P.2d at 688-89. As in Farber, if the Court were to have

required Appellant to bring a claim immediately upon the second unfavorable decision, and the
claim were to settle, said settlement would likewise be "based on pre-completion, speculative
damages or would have to await completion" of the appeals process, which would frustrate the
policy behind the Idaho Tort Claims act as laid out by the Idaho Supreme Court in that decision.
Therefore, this Court should VACATE the decision of the District Court with regard to the
date on which the period in which to file the Notice of Tort Claim accrued, and REMAND
accordingly.
2.

Presentment.
Alternatively, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that Appellant's prior

correspondence with the Department of Labor and the State of Idaho satisfies the requirements of
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the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

The District Court held, in its original decision, that it was

"undisputed" that the prior correspondence was never directed to the Secretary of State, and
essentially interprets Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659,339 P.3d 544 (2014) as creating a
strict requirement that the Notice, whether entitled as such or not, be received by the Secretary in
order to satisfy the terms of the ITCA.

See Memorandum Decision at 12. However, this

recognizes that, if the Notice is subsequently presented to the Secretary, the Presentment
requirement is satisfied. CNW, L.L.C. v. New Sweden Irrigation District, 161 Idaho 89,383 P.3d
1259 (2016).
This Court's decisions in Turner and CNW leave two important questions unanswered:
(1) If the Notice is received by an employee other than the Secretary prior to the expiration of
the 180 day deadline, but said employee does not deliver it until after the expiration of the
deadline, is the presentment requirement satisfied upon receipt of the employee or the Secretary;
and (2) do State or Subdivision employees have a duty to present claims that could reasonably
interpreted as Tort Claims, providing notice of potential litigation, to the Secretary for
processing?

In CNW, the claim was immediately presented to the Secretary, and so the

Presentment requirement was held to be satisfied. In Turner, the claim was presented to the
Mayor and a City Councilman, elected officials who arguably have no duty or authority to
address the claim. This case falls in between CNW and Turner - Mr. Johnson's correspondence
was presented to State employees who have a duty to direct received correspondence to the
appropriate person or department, rather than being directed to officials who have no duty or
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ability to process the same. As such, in light of the policy behind the ITCA as set forth in Farber
hereinabove, that the answer to both questions should be in the affirmative.
This Court has allowed documents to stand as satisfying the Notice requirement, even if
they do not follow a specific form, so long as their contents substantially comply. Smith v. City
of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621-22, 586 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (1978). In this case, the Johnsons

received an explicit admission from a State employee that their prior correspondence indicated
Mr. Johnson's intent to litigate this issue as early as January of 2016. Declaration of Rose
Johnson, Exhibits A and B (R. at 153-157). At that point, the State was clearly on notice of
potential litigation, and had the opportunity to begin to prepare for the same. Having received
and acknowledged this notice, Appellant submits that the State employee then not only had a
duty to, but possibly may have, passed the information on to the appropriate and necessary
personnel and channels, including the Secretary of State's Office, to be processed as a Tort
Claim. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results and frustrate the purpose of the statute.
(see Appellant's letter to Gov. and Attorney General and/or Idaho Department office, Dec.,
2015). For example, if State or Subdivision employees were held not to have a duty to send what
they recognize as possible tort claims to the appropriate authority, the State could essentially
immunize itself from tort liability by directing its mailroom staff and receptionists to hold all
notices of tort claims for 181 days, thus creating a de facto personal service requirement. This
was clearly not the Legislature's intent. As such, the District Court was in error in determining
that a presentment either had not taken place, or that the lack of presentment directly to the
Secretary of State, under these particular facts, failed to satisfy the requirements of the I.T.C.A.
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Finally, given the fact that the State clearly admits that, as early as January of 2016, it had
notice that litigation was inevitable (as per Johnson's December, 2015and 2017 letter, pp 108
and 181 in record), its false assurances that Mr. Johnson's complaints would be properly
addressed, and Mr. Johnson's reliance upon said assurances as set forth in his Declaration, (R. at
312), Exhibit A p. 59,60 Letter Exhibit B p. 62,63, and Exhibit A, p. 181, 182, 184. the State
should be held to be ESTOPPED from asserting lack of notice as a defense.
C.

The District Court erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration

and in denying Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery.

In the course of its denial of Respondent's first Motion for Fees and Costs, the District Court
recognized that this case is "very unusual", and that it was "reasonable" for Appellant to conclude
his date of accrual of April 29, 2016 (Decision denying IDOL Fees, Record at 246):
This was a very unusual case--one need only consider the sequence of events ...
Finally, on appeal of that second decision, the Industrial Commission, on April
29, 2016, reversed the IDOL's decision and awarded Mr. Johnson benefits. As
such, the Court finds that it was not unreasonable for Mr. Johnson to believealbeit incorrectly-that April 29, 2016, was the date the clock began to run on
the filing of his Notice of Tort Claim; and because a decision was issued on that
date, there was a reasonable basis in fact. ..
This conclusion (based upon the District Court and State's joint opinion), essentially, amounts to an
admission of a finding that a reasonable trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that Appellant
should have discovered his cause of action on April 29, 2016. Having come to this conclusion, the
District Court had the opportunity to reverse its prior grant of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, discussed below.
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Following the grant of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Appellant timely filed for
reconsideration. "A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may
be made at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after
the entry of final judgment." Idaho R. Civ. P. ll(a)(2)(B).

"When considering a motion for

reconsideration under Rule ll(a)(2), the district court should take into account any new facts,
law, or information presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the district
court's interlocutory order. However, new evidence is not required and the moving party can reargue the same issues in addition to new arguments." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,
808,291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Johnson v.
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the case law in applying

Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under that
rule, but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence."). Appellant, by
way of the same Motion, sought additional discovery, in order to address the issues as to whether
the Johnsons' repeated correspondence to the State either had been, or should have been, directed
to the Secretary of State for treatment as a Tort Claim. Record, at 312 #7, letter ex A p. 59,60
letter ex B p. 62,63, and ex A p. 181, 182, 184.
The District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, largely upon the same
reasoning as in its grant of the Motion to Dismiss. The District Court then summarily denied
Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery, without setting forth its reasoning for doing so.
Memorandum Decision Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Record at 248 - 251.

For the

reasons set forth in the preceding section, given that the District Court was in error in granting
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Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the District Court likewise abused its discretion in denying
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.
With regard to the denial of the Motion for Additional Discovery, Respondent had filed
its Motion to Dismiss at an early stage of the case, prior to Appellant having an opportunity to
conduct adequate Discovery. Appellant attempted, throughout the course of the proceedings, to
continue to investigate in order to gather relevant information that may be in the hands of
Respondents, including seeking the disclosure of various documents and information that would
reveal how, in fact, his prior correspondence with the Department should have been handled,
which bears directly upon Plaintiffs alternative theory that there may have been a "presentment"
of a tort claim based upon said correspondence. Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 1; Declaration of
Rose Johnson, ,r 10. (R. at 310-11 and 289).
At Oral Argument on Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for Respondents
(who also represented the Department during Plaintiffs Appeal to the Industrial Commission,
and who has been advising the Department with regard to Plaintiffs records requests), stated that
Plaintiffs request for the opportunity for discovery could result in "a hundred" depositions being
scheduled, Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 5 (R. at 310-11 ), Transcript p 49, lines 22-23, despite
the fact that Appellant never made such an absurd and irrational request. Further, in response to
a records request by Plaintiff, the Department quoted a fee in the amount of approximately onehundred-fifty dollars ($150), which indicates that it would require the production of records in
excess of one-hundred (100) pages and/or two (2) hours of staff work (but without an itemization
of the number of excess pages or hours). Idaho Code § 72-104(10). Moreover, the Department's
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responses have been often non-responsive and/or indicate confusion over Plaintiffs requests.
Declaration of Dale Johnson, , 1; Declaration of Rose Johnson, Exhibit B. (R. at 310-11 and
292-305). 1

Taken together, this indicates that there may be significant relevant evidence

available, that may possibly expose the Respondents to further liability, in Respondents'
possession, that may only be compelled to be disclosed via the Discovery process.

D.

The District Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Subsequent Post-judgment

Motions.
Following the denial of Reconsideration, Appellant filed a Motion for Additional
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based upon its lack of the same in its denial of
Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery, as well as a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which may also be treated as a Motion to
Alter/Amend under Rule 59(e). First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 603, 570 P.2d 276,
281 (1977). On of the purposes of a Motion under 59(e) is "to correct errors both of fact and law
that had occurred in its proceedings." and "[provide] a mechanism to circumvent appeal." Id.
In denying Appellant's Motion, one of the bases on which the District Court's decision is
the issue of timeliness. (R. at 333-34). However, in light of the fact that: (1) a Motion for
Reconsideration tolls the time for appeal; and (2) a motion under Rule 60(b) may also be

1

It should be noted that, during the course of the hearing on Appellant's Motions, counsel for Respondent attempted
to urge the District Court to downplay, or disregard, Mrs. Johnson's declarations, erroneously stating that her
statements are "irrelevant or they involve speculation or they involve statements where there's no showing of
personal knowledge on behalf of - by Mrs. Johnson. So I would respectfully request that this Court either not
consider those parts of the declaration or alternatively give that declaration little, any, weight." (Transcript, at 9-7,
lines. 2-12). Previously, Mrs. Johnson spoke directly with counsel for Respondent, prior to the filing of the Instant
Case, and, thus, he should be aware of the degree of her personal knowledge as to the matters to which she is
testifying in her Declaration.
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considered pursuant to Rule 59(e) which, in tum, pursuant to Neibaur, is a method to avoid
appeal at the District Court level, the logical conclusion would be that the Motion for
Reconsideration tolled the time in which to file a Motion under Rule 59(e) as well.

Since

Appellant's Post-judgment Motions were filed within fourteen (14) days of the District Court's
decision denying said motions, the post-judgment Motions, as well as the instant appeal, were
timely filed. Otherwise, the District Court again erred in affirming its prior decisions based upon
its previous reasoning, for the reasons set forth hereinabove.
Further, Appellant has set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the judgment, pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and (6) for "unique and compelling circumstances." See,
e.g. Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 726, 275 P.3d 589, 591 (2011). Deprived of the ability

to conduct further Discovery, Appellants attempted to continue investigate the existence of
possible additional evidence in this case by submitting public records requests to the Department.
Declaration of Dale Johnson, 17. (R. at 179). As set forth in the Declarations of Plaintiff and his
wife, the Department, apparently acting pursuant to the advice of the same counsel as is
representing it in the instant case, has consistently delayed its responses, claimed a lack of
understanding, and sought fees for the requested copies, without specifying the number of pages
in excess of one-hundred or hours in excess of two that would justify these additional charges.
Id., Exhibit A.

Coupled with the representations of Respondent's counsel that allowing discovery could
result in depositions of a large number of witnesses, this indicates that there may be a significant
body of evidence that may assist Appellant in showing that the prior correspondence, if not
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actually directed to the Secretary of State's Office, at the very least should have been under
pertinent rules and procedures. Further, the representation of the Department on Appellant's
unemployment claim at the Industrial Commission stage, its handling of Appellant's records
requests, and the instant litigation, by the same counsel places Respondent in a very unique
position to choose the information to which Appellant has access, whereas the Department
essentially has unfettered access to any and all documents concerning Appellant that are relevant
to this case.

Without the ability to obtain the possible evidence in the possession of the

Department, Appellant was, and is, at a very significant disadvantage, to the extent that the
inability to access said evidence provides sufficient grounds under Rule 60(b)( 6)'s general
provisions to re-open this case. Therefore, the District Court was likewise in error in denying
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and this Court should REVERSE and REMAND this
matter to the District Court accordingly.
Since: (a) Appellant did not know the extent of his damages and, therefore, discover a
cause of action for Negligence until April 29, 2016 at the earliest, the date on which the Idaho
Industrial Commission issued its decision in Appellant's favor; (b) alternatively, Appellant's
body of previous correspondence to the State of Idaho qualify as "tort claims" for the purposes of
the Idaho Tort Claims Act and, if discovery were possible, could be determined, at a minimum,
as being of such of a nature that it should have been forwarded to the Secretary of State for
consideration as a tort claim; (c) the State's acknowledgment of Appellant's intent to litigate in
response to said correspondence should estop the State from asserting lack of notice as a defense;

and (d) the fact that the District Court wrongfully denied Appellant its opportunity to conduct
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further discovery in order to support the aforementioned arguments, the District Court was in
error in granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and denying Appellant's post-judgment
motions.

IV.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment herein should be
REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for further proceedings and a jury trial, as demanded
in the Original Complaint.
DATED this 22d day of April, 2019.
JAMES McMILLAN,
/s/ James McMillan
Attorney for Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 22d day of April, 2019, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method indicated below:
Doug Werth
Deputy Attorney General
317 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83735
Attorney for Respondents

U.S. Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125
_X_ E-filelOdyssey

Isl James McMillan
James McMillan

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

19

